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Summary: The benchmark risk-averse equilibrium model does not explain 
some of the outcomes obtained in experiments with first-price auctions. None-
theless, the presence of non-linear bidding and the wide dispersion of bids 
have received little attention in the literature. I focus on these issues and revisit
previous laboratory evidence with the help of model-based clustering tech-
niques. The rejection of equilibrium models is found to be mostly due to the 
significance of non-linear bidding rules and the unexplained heterogeneity.
With the use of a mixture model, the observations are classified into four
groups or clusters. Significant differences between individuals and clusters are
found, but so is a persistent within individual variation, which leads us to con-
clude that subjects do not commit to one particular bidding strategy and alter-
nate across several processes.
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In the empirical auctions literature a well-known result is that the subjects in experi-
ments of independent first-price private-value auctions do not bid as predicted by 
risk-neutral equilibrium (RNE). As stated in Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Elena 
Katok (2007, p. 82) "this result has been replicated numerous times by different re-
searchers at different laboratories and under a variety of environments''. The reason 
for this is the prevalence of some phenomena in the data that cannot be explained by 
the benchmark Nash equilibrium models of bidding. First, individuals tend to make 
bids above the predicted RNE bid – henceforth, overbidding. Second, uniformly va-
luated bidders make bids that are not proportional to their valuations – henceforth, 
non-linearity. Third, bids display high volatility around the mean bidding function – 
henceforth, overdispersion. 
From these, researchers have concentrated their efforts on solving the puzzle 
posed by overbidding. Researchers first explored the role of risk aversion in the equi-
librium bid function.
1 Thus, Cox, Bruce Roberson, and Smith (1982) propose a mod-
                                                        
1 An extensive literature explores several alternative hypotheses besides risk aversion, such as individual 
interaction (Mark Isaac and James Walker 1985; John Morgan, Ken Stiglitz, and George Reis 2003), 
learning direction theory (Wiggans 1989; Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten 2005; Tibor Neugebauer 
and Selten 2006), step-level reasoning (Uri Gneezy 2005), joy of winning (James Cox, Vernon Smith, 
and James Walker 1983), biased incentives (Glenn Harrison 1989), and Quantal Response Equilibrium 
(Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt, and Thomas Palfrey 2002). Most of these models assume bounded-
rationality on the behalf of agents, and some of them provide testable restrictions aiming to explain the 
phenomenon of overbidding.  
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el in which individuals display utility functions with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRAM) and find that the model fits the experimental data reasonably well. Later 
on, Kay-Yut Chen and Charles R. Plott (1998) also find that CRRAM performs bet-
ter than many other simpler non-fully rational models. However, they also propose a 
sophisticated ad-hoc model with an even better fit. This model specifies a non-linear 
bidding function for the agents, thus challenging the linear bidding specification. 
More recently, the non-linearity of the bidding function has been further ex-
plored in Olivier Armantier and Nicolas Treich (2006). These authors postulate a 
downward bias in how the individuals perceive their winning prospects in an auction 
(beliefs). The authors conduct an auction experiment in which the treatment of be-
liefs and preferences is separated and find that according to their proposition, sub-
jects consistently underestimate their chances of winning, which explains why the 
bidding function is not linear in valuations. In an independent work, Paul Pezanis-
Christou and Andrés Romeu (2002) propose to estimate the equilibrium bidding 
model using a Beta distribution for the valuations instead of the standard uniform. 
When valuations are Beta distributed, the corresponding equilibrium bidding func-
tion is non-linear and concave. The authors conclude that this could be the conse-
quence of a misperception of the subject’s chances of winning. Finally, Patrick Bajari 
and Ali Hortacsu (2005) examine the data in Douglas Dyer, John Kagel, and Dan 
Levin (1989) to assess the performance of different structural equilibrium models. 
They find that the risk aversion model outperforms not only the risk neutral but also 
equilibrium models with learning. Besides that, the Quantal Response Equilibrium 
model, in which individuals are allowed to make errors in equilibrium, provides a 
remarkably good fit under a Beta distribution.  
Apart from the observed non-linearity, it is often the case that conditional on 
valuations, the bids do not lie close to the expected bidding function. The standard 
way to deal with this problem is the addition of an error term that incorporates any 
potential source of heterogeneity, such as sampling error, individual and/or session 
differences, computing errors, or the learning process. In some cases, however, the 
unexplained variability is too big to be ignored and we should try to find at least a 
clue on the nature of this overdispersion.  
In this paper, we aim to provide a deeper insight on the explanatory power of 
the equilibrium models regarding the two phenomena of non-linearity and overdis-
persion, and why they may fail. The data come from two different experimental auc-
tion data sources: Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989), and Cox, Smith, and Walker 
(1988). From a methodological point of view, the paper is novel in that we use a 
model-based clustering technique to analyze the data that to our knowledge had nev-
er been used before in the context of empirical auctions. 
We find that the risk aversion equilibrium model is rejected on the basis of a 
significant non-linear bidding and the unexplained overdispersion mostly coming 
from individual between and within heterogeneity. Put simply, different bidders use 
different bidding strategies, but also some bidders change their strategy several times 
during one session. This justifies the use of a clustering technique that lets the data 
determine the optimal characterization of groups or clusters of observations. Cluster-
ing is then used to identify groups of homogeneous bidding and to discriminate be-
tween recognizable patterns of bidding strategies.  
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A model-based clustering approach and the expectation-maximization (EM) 
algorithm are used to find a representation of the data in terms of a mixture of densi-
ties. Groups of observations or clusters in the data are identified using the posterior 
probability of sampling from each group. Four clusters are found to provide the best 
representation of the data in terms of fit. Some clusters tend to capture noisy bidding, 
but most of the observations are classified into clusters characterized by concave 
non-linear bidding above the RNE prediction. Finally, we find significant differences 
of posterior cluster probability between individuals, but they do not perfectly classify 
observations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we briefly explain 
the equilibrium models of bidding. In Section 2 we present the data and perform an 
initial empirical analysis. Section 3 contains a brief description of the mixture model 
and the results of estimation. Section 4 presents some final conclusions.  
 
1. Equilibrium Bidding with Risk Aversion 
 
In a first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders compete for the purchase of a single com-
modity. The good is awarded to the highest bidder for a price equal to her bid. Each 
bidder i=1,...,N is assumed to receive a private reservation value vi that is an inde-
pendent draw from a distribution Fv with support V=[0,v
u]. A bidder with value vi 
who submits a bid bi receives a monetary payment of wi=vi-bi if she wins the auction, 
i.e., if bi>bj for all j≠i and receives wi=0 otherwise. In the CRRAM model, bidders 
are assumed to display monetary payment utility functions of the form U(w,r)=w
r. 
The coefficient r is the Arrow-Pratt index of constant relative risk aversion. We as-
sume that r is distributed across individuals according to some distribution function 
Gr with support R=[0,r ]. The distributions Fv, Gr and the number of bidders N are 
common knowledge, but the value realizations vi and the coefficient or risk aversion 
ri are information private to the individual. 
In this context, a bidding strategy b(v,r) is a Symmetric Bayes Nash Equili-
brium (SBNE) if for all valuations, bidding bi=b(vi,ri) is a best response for bidder i 
when all bidders j i also bid b(vj,rj). Eric Maskin and John Riley (2000) show that if 
bi is a bidder's best response, then it is monotone increasing in valuations. Thus, let 
p(b,r) stand for the inverse of b(v,r). The expected payoff of bidder i is defined as  
 
        
1 , , ;
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If an individual with valuation vi is planning to bid a quantity bi, then the 
quantity qi=(vi-bi)/bi is the monetary profit per dollar bid in case of winning the auc-
tion with bi. In equilibrium, there exists a relationship between the profit per dollar, 
the risk aversion coefficient, and the probabilities of winning, arising from the first-
order conditions of maximization of (1): 
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The above equation implies that in equilibrium the coefficient of risk aversion 
must equal the profit per dollar at stake times the elasticity of the chances of winning. 
This elasticity can be obtained in closed form if we allow Fv to take a specific para-
metric form. The data set to be used in the next section comes from auction experi-
ments that use the uniform distribution to sample individual valuations. Without loss 
of generality, normalize the support of the uniform to [0,1]. Then, the chances of 
winning with a bid of b simplify to Er p(b,r)
N-1 whenever b≤b whereb is the maxi-
mum bid of the least risk-averse bidder, i.e., p(b ,r )=1. In that case, it can be 
shown
2 that the differential equation in (2) has a closed form solution with 
 






















After substitution in (2), it is found that the expression for the profit per dollar 
reduces to qi=ri/(N-1). We can also use (3) to find the bidding function for the partic-
ular case where subjects share the same risk aversion coefficient r. The risk-averse 
symmetric Nash equilibrium (RASNE) is 
 



















  for all    0,1  i v   (5)
 
2. A First Empirical Analysis of the Data 
 
Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) (DKL) investigate the effect of uncertainty about the 
number of bidders
3 on the market outcomes of first-price sealed-bid auctions with 
independent private values. They design a series of experiments with subjects re-
cruited from MBA classes at the University of Houston. There are three sessions. In 
each session, a different group of six subjects act as bidders competing for the pos-
session of a single item. Sessions are divided into a series of trading periods, each 
period consisting of either two small (N=3) markets or one single large (N=6) mar-
ket. Our first source of data corresponds to the DKL data where we have available 23 
periods or rounds for the first two groups of six bidders and 19 rounds for the last 
group. This gives 780 observations, half of them with N=3 and half with N=6 bid-
ders.  
                                                        
2 A detailed guide on how to invert the bidding function and solve for equilibrium can be found in Cox, 
Smith, and Walker (1988) or Maskin and Riley (2000). 
3 Because the purpose of the Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) experiment is different from what is intended 
here, we selected from their experimental design only those sessions where there was no uncertainty on 
the number of bidders named by the authors as the “contingent” sessions.  
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The second source of data is taken from Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988) 
(CSW). These authors collect data from eight series of experiments of sealed-bid 
first-price and Dutch auctions in Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) and in Cox, 
Smith, and Walker (1985). We select only those series of experiments consisting of 
sequences of the first-price, named series 4 in the CSW paper, and consisting of 10 
sessions of 25 rounds or auctions with 4 bidders. Valuations are drawn uniformly 
from [0,10]. 
Summarizing, the data set consists of 1780 observations, 390 with N=3 
(DKL3), 1000 with N=4 (CSW4), and 390 with N=6 (DKL6) bidders. For each of the 
40 individuals and round, bids and valuation are observed. 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988).
 
Figure 1  Plot of Bid Data; Solid Line is the RNE Prediction; Dashed Line is the 45º Degree 
 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of bids and valuations for the N=3, N=4, and 
N=6 cases labeled as DKL3, CSW4, and DKL6, respectively. The risk-neutral equi-
librium prediction as of equation (6) and the 45-degree line are also plotted. Noticea-
ble is the pervasive presence of bids above the risk-neutral prediction (overbidding), 
particularly above the 0.5 valuations. This phenomenon is more extreme in CSW4 
where some bids are above the corresponding valuations – the 45 degree line – that 
do not appear in the CSW data and may reflect differences in the experiment design. 
Also in this panel, we can find extremely low bids for low-medium valuations. For 
the data in DKL3 and DKL6, bids are much less dispersed, especially in the latter. 
The differences in the bid spread, i.e., the distance between bid and the 45 line of 
valuations, are another interesting aspect of the data: for valuations above one half,  
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the bid spread seems to be non-monotonically increasing, particularly in the DKL3 
and DKL6 cases, contrary to the linear bidding prediction of the equilibrium model.
4 
Moreover, this phenomenon seems less evident for CSW4, pointing again to substan-
tial differences in the outcome of both experiment designs. 
We now propose a model for the CRRAM equilibrium bidding using the profit 
per dollar variable (q), instead of the raw bids. As shown in Section 2, under equili-
brium and uniform valuations
5 the profit per dollar qit of bidder i in round t should be 
constant and equal to ri/(N-1), thus not depending on valuations. Hence, our first spe-
cification for qit includes a constant term and a quadratic function on valuations. In-
dividual (ci) and time (wt) effects are also included to capture unobserved hetero-




2 1 0 it t i it it it u w c v v q            (6)
 
Significance of the 1,  2 coefficients  will be read as a rejection of the 
CRRAM model. Otherwise, an estimate of the individual coefficient of risk aversion 
may be obtained as (N-1)·(0+ci). Table 1 shows the results of estimating (6) using 
different specifications. The third column shows the estimates of pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) of (6) without including individual and time effects. The second 
column shows the estimation of a model with random effects ci and including time 
dummies wt. The third column presents the estimates of a random effects model in 
which variables are in deviation with respect to the mean of the corresponding round 
t, to account for the time effect. 
 






Round dummies Deviations 
  0  0.298 0.404 0.380 
3  1  -0.314 -0.612 -0.557 
  2  0.260 0.486 *0.448 
  0  0.188 0.336 0.187 
4  1  -0.397 -0.380 -0.386 
  2  0.421 0.416 0.411 
  0  0.253 0.315 0.264 
6  1  -0.464 -0.507 -0.495 
  2  0.402 0.431 0.422 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
                                                        
4 Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) consider the role of the money that the winner ceases to earn 
once she is aware that the second bidder’s bid is below hers (MLOT regret) and the missed opportunity to 
win if the second bidder’s bid is above price (MOTW regret). If bidders do care about MLOT and 
MOTW regret, the observed non-linearity could well respond to a higher expected amount of MLOT 
regret or a smaller amount of MOTW regret, or both. 
5 As pointed out by one referee, the equilibrium is not unique and other non-linear equilibria may exist 
though they are harder to characterize. Thus, rejection of linear bidding does not necessarily mean rejec-
tion of the equilibrium model as a whole.  
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Estimates of the 1, 2 coefficients are found to be significant in almost all cas-
es, except for the OLS and N=3, which may respond to the relative inefficiency of 
OLS with respect to generalized least squares in panel estimation. It is worth noting 
that the negative sign on the coefficient 1 does not imply that q is decreasing on val-
uations, because the specification is quadratic. In fact, if we consider the 2 coeffi-
cients, the profit per dollar invested q is increasing in valuations. Since q is defined 
as (v-b)/b, the mean bid b/v must be decreasing or, equivalently, the bidding function 
must be concave. 
A Wald test on the significance of the wt round effects shows significance at 
least for the CSW4 (p<0.05) and DKL6 (p<0.01) cases. Moreover, a Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test for the individual effects shows significance (Prob 

2(1)<0.01) in all cases. The individual differences account for nearly one quarter of 
the unobserved variability. Therefore, the variability between individuals is relevant 
to explain the bidding behavior in our data set.  
The model in (6) incorporates individual effects but ignores the presence of 
variability within individuals. The presence of individual effects assumes that bid-
ding behavior may be clusterized at the individual level alone so that we impose the 
group structure of the data, while it would be better to relax such a restriction by let-
ting the data themselves tell us the best characterization of the data in terms of clus-
ters. This is the main purpose of clustering analysis, and what we aim to do in the 
next section. 
 
3. The Model-Based Clustering Approach 
 
In the analysis of clusters (say, clustering) observations are classified into groups of 
homogeneous data that are similar according to the criterion and measure of similari-
ty chosen. In this paper, we follow a model-based approach to clustering (MBC). To 
our knowledge, MBC had never been used before in the context of empirical auctions 
or experimental data. In MBC a flexible probabilistic model such as a mixture of 
densities characterizes the data-generating process. Once estimated, observations are 
assigned to clusters using the ex-post probability of sampling from each of the mix-
ture components. By doing so, we may find homogeneous groups of observations 
whose characterization may be tested against the Nash predictions or alternatives. 
Another advantage of MBC is that it permits weighting for the ex-post probability 
that each observation belongs to that cluster when we are interested in estimating a 
model for one particular set of observations, for instance those following the Nash 
predictions. That point, however, is out of the scope of this paper.  
Let q represent as before the profit per bid and v the individual valuations. We 
will assume that q is sampled from one of H different sub-populations with some ex-
ante sampling probability given by parameter h for h=1,...,H. The sub-populations 
are assumed to be normal with unknown mean and variance, and thus characterized 
by a vector of parameters   
'
012 ,,, hh h h h    .  
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The mean of cluster h is defined as E(q | v, h) = 0h + 1hv + 2hv
2, where v are 
the individual valuations.
6 Finding that the 1h,2h are non-significantly different from 
zero for one particular h would imply that the observations sampled from this sub-
population have constant mean, or equivalently that the bids were obtained from a 
linear bidding function, as shown in Section 2. Thus, the observations belonging to 
this cluster would meet the restrictions that the equilibrium models impose.  
How does the MBC assign observations to clusters? The procedure implies 
maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of the parameters of interest by maximiza-
tion of the normal mixture log-likelihood of the data: 
 









1 , ln . , , . ln           (7)
 
where f (q |v,θh’) is the normal density, with the mean and variance parameterized 
with θ.  
The MBC is in essence a problem of latent variables, where the researcher can 
observe the data point but not the cluster it belongs to. In this context, the EM algo-
rithm (Geoffrey McLachlan and David Peel 2000) is particularly useful in finding 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of interest θ in (8). The EM algo-
rithm performs two steps at every iteration: in the first step (M-step), estimates  h  ˆ  
for h=1,…,H are obtained after maximization of the complete log-likelihood of the 
data and the latent. In the second step, estimates of the posterior probabilities of clus-
ter membership of subject i in period t (say 
h












h it it h









The algorithm goes on until a convergence criterion is reached. In this paper, we use 
Aitken’s acceleration procedure (Dankmar Böhning et al. 1994), which improves the 
speed and numerical stability of the EM algorithm.  
After convergence, estimates of the parameters of interest θ and the posterior 
probabilities s are available. Both are of interest in our research: parameters θ charac-
terize the clusters that generated the data, and posterior probabilities s can be used for 
cluster classification. Inference on θ makes use of the covariance matrix of the para-
meters of interest computed with the gradients of the complete log-likelihood and a 
Parzen kernel as suggested in McLachlan and Peel (2000). Posterior probabilities s 
                                                        
6 Note that the individual CRRAM effects disappear from the specification of the mean. The reason is 
that under the clustering specification, with the underlying data generated according to the CRRAM 
model, we would find that individual bids belong to one single cluster and that the number of clusters H 
is the number of different risk aversion coefficients among the individuals. Therefore, the MBC specifi-
cation of the mean encompasses the CRRAM individual effects.  
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are used in the classification of the data as follows: we compute 
h
it s ˆ  for h=1,…,H 
using (8) and the estimates  ˆ, and then we assign each observation to the cluster 
with the highest ex-post probability. 
 
3.1 The Number of Components 
 
Starting from the single sample (H=1), we estimate the mixture with up to seven 
components in search for the best specification. The reason is that deciding the num-
ber H of members (or clusters) in the mixture is a difficult issue and an old debate in 
the literature. Basically there are two approaches to the problem: hypothesis testing 
versus fit criterion such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Because the 
technical difficulties associated with the likelihood ratio test or other alternatives are 
burdensome
7 we will use the second approach. The BIC penalizes the number of pa-
rameters by adding two times the number of parameters and the log of sample size to 
minus the log-likelihood. When the BIC is used as a guide, finding a parsimonious 
parameterization of the model as an outcome is expected.
8  
 
Table 2   Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) of the Mixture for Different Specifications  
on the Number of Components 
 
Num. of  
members (H)  
Num. of  
parameters  DKL3 DKL6 CSW 
1  3    -429.49       -668.18        -915.64     
2  7    -440.04       -812.99        -259.72    
3  11    -471.71       -818.04        -464.71    
4  15    -470.54       -844.24        -522.47    
5  19    -470.61       -838.01        -517.81    
6  23    -454.33       -823.72        -509.36    
7  27    -455.54       -821.98        -512.15    
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
Table 2 shows a summary of the BIC for the different specifications. For 
CSW4 and DKL6, the minimum BIC is reached at H=4, while the minimum for DKL 
is reached at H=3, although the differences between the H=3, H=4, and H=5 are 
small and H=4 is a good choice in terms of fit for all three treatments. For this rea-
son, the analysis that follows will be referred to the H=4 specification. 
 
3.2 Characterizing the Clusters 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the ex-ante probabilities of clusters and the coeffi-
cients of the mean of the normal components of the mixture.   
Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot the observations classified by cluster where each ob-
servation is assigned to the cluster with the highest ex-post probability.  
                                                        
7 See, for instance, Bruno Goffinet, Patrice Losiel, and Beatrice Laurent (1992), Jiahua Chen and Ping 
Cheng (1997), or Didier Dacunha-Castelle and Elisabeth Gassiat (1997) for examples of very limited and 
particular solutions. 
8 Brian G. Leroux (1992), for instance, proves that the BIC does not underestimate the number of com-
ponents asymptotically.  
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Parameters ( )  Test 






1 0.0134  1.1496  3.4491 -3.4076  1.93 
2 0.1576  0.8598  -1.3116  0.7048  24.3 
3 0.2597  0.2814  -0.1342 0.1398  0.2 






1 0.1439  0.4234  -0.6632 0.7792  1.34 
2 0.1585  0.0049 0.0315  -0.0114  19.6 
3 0.3290  0.0663  -0.1667  0.2233  124.5 






1 0.0830  0.3774  -1.1434  1.0219  216.7 
2 0.1227  0.7523  -1.4522  0.9022  81.5 
3 0.1687  0.3032  -0.4019  0.3375  13.6 
4 0.6256  0.1043  -0.1430  0.2032  29.6 
 




Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
 
Figure 2  DKL3 Observations Classified by Cluster 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
 




Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
 
Figure 4  DKL6 Observations by Cluster 
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Our main conclusions are as follows: 
Clusters differ in their relative size. Thus, clusters 3 and 4 contain more than 
80% of the sample in DKL3, more than 70% in CSW4, and almost 80% in DKL6. 
Therefore, it seems that there are some bidding strategies that are particularly popular 
among agents. It is found that in particular the biggest clusters are characterized by 
overbidding plus non-linearly concave bidding behavior. 
Clusters with the highest size show non-linear bidding and thus reject the 
equilibrium model. In all treatments, the type of bidding classified by these high-
frequency clusters is similar. In CSW4, bids in clusters 3 and 4 are characterized by 
non-linear bidding, as confirmed by the individual and joint significance of the linear 
and quadratic coefficients in Table 3. In DKL6, clusters 3 and 4 also represent non-
linear bid functions, although the dispersion in general for these data is much smaller 
than in other treatments, thus increasing the precision of the tests. Visual inspection 
of cluster 3 in Figure 3, for instance, shows a slight downward slope at the 0.8 valua-
tion and above, enough to reject the hypothesis of linear bidding as shown in Table 3. 
A similar phenomenon appears in cluster 2 of DKL3 where the presence of a few 
“underbidding” observations leads to rejection of linear bids. Finally, clusters 3 and 4 
in DKL3 differ in that cluster 3, which contains 26% of the sample, does not reject 
the risk-averse equilibrium model of Section 2. However, the CRRAM model is re-
jected for cluster 4 with 57% of the sample. 
Some clusters capture noisy or risk-loving bidding. This is quite evident in 
the case of cluster 1 of DKL3 and CSW4 data. In the first case, an estimate of 
0=1.15 would mean under CRRAM a risk aversion coefficient of 3. In other words, 
this cluster is capturing risk-loving subjects betting to earn a high profit per dollar 
exposed despite the risk. The upper left panel of Figure 3 shows the classified obser-
vations for this cluster position to be well below the RNE prediction. This behavior is 
nevertheless very minoritary with less than 1.5% of prior. This is not so much for 
cluster 1 in the CSW4 data. The type of behavior captured in this cluster is extremely 
noisy and diffuse (see first panel of Figure 3). An important number of irrational or 
dominated bids in this cluster are even above the 45-degree line, i.e., above self-
valuation and with negative expected profit, and this makes a difference with the 
DKL3 case, which makes us consider the role of experiment design in obtaining this 
noisy behavior. It is interesting to note the ability of the clustering methodology to 
identify correctly those observations and to classify them in an own cluster. 
A significant part of the heterogeneity is due to individual differences. Do 
individuals tend to bid persistently as of one particular cluster? We are interested in 
checking whether the clustering process has attributed individual behavior to particu-
lar clusters, thus separating the agents. To this purpose, we build a two-way table of 
the observations attending to individual and cluster, and we compute some statistics 
as shown in Table 4.  
Column 1 shows the ex-ante probability for each cluster for reference. Column 
2 displays the average ex-post probability (see the definition of s
h in equation 8) of 
each cluster computed over the individuals whose bids are classified as belonging to 
that cluster more (less in column 3) frequently than expected by . The number of 
individuals so classified is given in parenthesis. Roughly, the numbers in columns 2  
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Table 4   Summary of Results of a Two-way Table of Cluster and Individuals;  




Ex-ante Mean posterior  Pearson 
  Prob () Above Below   test 
DKL3 
1 0.0134 0.06(4)  0.00(14)  
2 0.1576  0.23(6)  0.02(12)  164.06 
3 0.2597  0.41(7)  0.11(11)  
4 0.5693  0.88(9)  0.46(9)  
CSW4 
1 0.1439 0.26(15) 0.02(25)  
2 0.1585  0.46(12) 0.07(28)  650.03 
3 0.3290  0.58(14) 0.23(26)  
4 0.3686 0.58(17)  0.17(23)  
DKL6 
1 0.0830 0.17(9)  0.02(9)  
2 0.1227  0.21(5)  0.03(13)  144.52 
3 0.1687  0.28(12) 0.01(6)  
4 0.6256  0.83(8)  0.48(10)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Dyer, Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Cox, Smith, and Walker (1988). 
 
and 3 give an idea of how many bidders would be or would not be labeled as “cluster  
X bidders” and for how much. Thus, for cluster 1 in the DKL3 data, 4 out of the 18 
individuals in the sample send more than the ex-ante expected 1.4% of their bids as 
cluster-1-type bids. For those more-than-the-rest cluster 1 bidders the average ex-
post probability of cluster-1-type bids is around 6%. Cluster 1 in DKL3 depicts a 
risk-loving compatible behavior, so that it could be said that there are 4 individuals in 
the sample that occasionally (6%) bid risky, while the remaining 14 never try that. 
On the other hand, one half of the individuals in DKL3 (9 out of the 18) tend to bid 
as of cluster 4, i.e, the concave bidding above the RNE prediction type 90% of the 
time. Something similar happens in CSW4 where 17 out of 40 subjects bid 58% of 
times according to cluster 4. It must be noted here, however, that 15 out of 40 bid as 
of cluster 1, a cluster with dominated bids and very noisy, more than 25% of the 
time. Finally, DKL6 also shows that almost one half of the subjects tend to bid con-
cave and above RNE 83% of the time (cluster 4 of DKL6).  
Finally, the last column of Table 4 presents a Pearson test of independence be-
tween clusters and subjects. The main conclusion is that individual differences ex-
plain a significant portion of the cluster classification in all datasets but that the rela-
tion is far from perfect. As an illustration, the bids of individual number 2 of CSW4 
do not seem to respond to any particular pattern: she bids 6 times as of cluster 1, 4 
times as of cluster 2, 8 times as of cluster 3, and 6 times as of cluster 4, so that her 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have revisited laboratory auction data aiming to the prevalence of 
non-linear bidding behavior and identifying noisy or irrational behavior that could be 
responsible for the observed data dispersion in experiments. When we fit a mixture 
model to the data, we obtain several interesting findings: that the clusters of bigger 
size represent non-linear concave bidding, that noisy or risk-loving attitudes are fil-
tered in one cluster, and that a significant portion of the clustering is explained by 
individual behavior. Regarding this last point, however, it is also noted that clusters 
do not exactly classify individuals. In other words, most individuals display bids of 
different clusters. This is consistent with a framework where experiment subjects do 
not consistently follow a bidding strategy but randomize among alternatives or even 
a framework similar to the approach of Armantier and Treich (2006) where bidders 
move among a set of different bidding strategies depending on their prospects of 
winning.  
In view of the results, it seems that once we eliminate the mask of noisy or 
gambling bidding that increases the dispersion of the data, subjects in experiments 
are not only characterized by the well-known phenomenon of overbidding but also 
by a persistent trend to display concave bidding functions, which leads us to con-
clude that more emphasis in explaining this anomaly of the bidding data should be 
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